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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a static computable general equilibrium model (CGE) linked to a 
microsimulation model to analyze how the global crisis and some adopted policy responses 
may have affected the Uruguayan economy. The focus is on the trade channel and foreign 
capital flows, since they are the most important mechanisms through which the global crisis 
affected the Uruguayan economy. The crisis had a strong impact on exports and fixed 
investment. Poorest households would be the most affected, as they face a stronger reduction 
in real wages and a rise in unemployment. We find a negative impact on extreme poverty, but 
not on moderate poverty, as households near the poverty line would benefit from the fall in 
some consumer prices. A policy based in increasing current public consumption does 
moderately counteract some negative impacts of the crisis, but benefits mainly skilled 
workers, and does not act directly towards the most affected.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis that burst in September 2008 soon spread throughout the world and 
became a major global economic crisis. World GDP fell 2% in 2009, and world exports 
experienced the highest fall since the Great Depression of 1930s (10.5% fall in volume and 
20.4% in value)
2. The epicenter of the crisis was in the developed economies financial systems, 
mainly United States and Europe, but the financial and economic links with the rest of the 
world soon took the crisis to developing countries. 
 
Uruguay was not an exception. After six years of steady GDP growth rate following 2002 
recession, during the first quarter of 2009 real GDP showed the first decrease (-2.9%). 
Although GDP immediately recovered during the second quarter of 2009, there was a 
substantial slowdown of GDP growth rate for 2009 (Figure 1).  
 
After the deepening of the crisis, macroeconomic forecasts of GDP, prices and manufacturing 
growth in Argentina and Brazil were significantly revised downwards. To the extent that 
Uruguayan economic growth is very closely linked to that of the two main partners (Argentina 
and Brazil), downward revisions in forecasts of these economies implied similar reductions in 
forecasts for the country’s economic growth, and in particular for the manufacturing sector, 
where there is a strong trade link with the MERCOSUR area. Indeed, the manufacturing sector 
experienced a decline of 3.8% in 2009, after six years of impressive growth, averaging 13%. 
 
 
                                                 
2 IMF, World Economic Outlook, July 2010   4 
Figure 1. Uruguay: Real GDP growth (% annual) 
 
Source: BCU, forecasts by Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) 
 
As a consequence of the reversal of the economic cycle, in the  first months of 2009 
government revenues showed a shortfall and the fiscal deficit significantly expanded. While 
government projections before the beginning of the crisis situated the fiscal deficit in -0.4% of 
GDP for 2009, the fiscal deficit finally reached -1.7% of GDP last year. Besides, the declining 
growth has potential negative implications for income, employment, investment and, in the 
last instance, for poverty. The negative impact on poverty is reached through two 
mechanisms: on one hand, through  a fall in labor demand, implying an increase in 
unemployment and a fall in wages; and on the other hand, through a fall in government 
revenue, which in turn could have a negative effect on public transfers to poor households.  
 
This paper aims to analyze the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the 
Uruguayan economy, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and 
microsimulations. It also discusses to what extent the policy responses of the Uruguayan 
government were effective in counteracting the negative effects of the crisis. This exercise is 
not only important to understand the different channels through which the economic crisis 
affected the country, but also to discuss and propose countercyclical policy options. This 
assessment  is particularly important for Uruguay, a small open economy that has been 
exposed to several external shocks in the last 20 years.  
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 describes the 
channels of transmission of the global crisis in Uruguay. Section 3 briefly describes the CGE 
model applied, the data used and the simulations carried out. Section 4 presents some major 
findings and section 5 concludes.   5 
2.  Main channels of transmission of the global crisis  
 
Even though the economic crisis started in the financial sector of the developed world, the 
crisis soon spread throughout the world. The main channels of transmission of the crisis to the 
developing countries have been discussed extensively: i) collapse in global trade and fall in 
international prices; ii) drop in capital flows, affecting FDI and equity investment; iii) fall in 
remittances; and iv) fall in aid flows (Willem te Verde, 2008; World Bank, 2009). While the last 
two channels do not seem to be important for the Uruguayan case, the first two channels did 
play a role in transmitting the global crisis to the domestic economy, as we present next.  
2.1. Trade channel 
The first channel of transmission of the crisis to our economy is that related to the effects on 
exports, via a decline in global demand and via the reduction of prices of key export 
commodities. Uruguay is a small open economy with relatively low protection levels and 
integrated to MERCOSUR (see Table 1). The country has strong comparative advantages in 
agriculture and food products and is highly dependent on imports of intermediate inputs. 
Before the 2002 economic crisis that followed the sharp currency devaluation in Brazil and 
Argentina and led the Uruguayan economy into a strong recession, almost half of Uruguayan 
exports were destined to the MERCOSUR area. That situation reversed after the 2002 crisis, 
and by 2008, MERCOSUR concentrated 27% of Uruguayan exports. It is important to notice, 
however, that although MERCOSUR has strongly decreased its importance, it continues being 
the main trade partner of the economy. Moreover, exports of services (which averaged 25% of 
total exports in the last six years, and include mainly tourism and logistic services) are mostly 
destined to Argentina and Brazil.  
Table 1. Main trade indicators for Uruguay. 1997-2009 
  1997 2001 2005 2007 2009 
Trade Openness*  37.7 36.3 58.9 57.9  52.0 
Main trade partners (% total trade)           
Mercosur  46.1  42.8  33.0  38.0  37.9 
European Union  9.3  8.8  14.4  8.9  6.3 
United States  19.8  18.8  13.9  13.5  12.3 
China  2.9  4.4  5.0  8.4  11.2 
Average external tariff**  9.5  11.9  9.4  9.2  9.3 
Average intrazone tariff**  1.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Export price index (annual percentage variation)  Nd  -3.6  2.7  12.6 -13.5 
Source: own elaboration with data from Central Bank of Uruguay (national accounts), Chamber of 
Industries of Uruguay and Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
Notes: *Trade Openness = (Exports + Imports)/GDP*100. All variables are at current prices. 
**Simple average 
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On the other hand, Uruguayan exports are highly concentrated in agriculture and food 
products, for which the country presents comparative advantages, as Table 2 shows. Meat, 
cereals (rice and wheat), dairy products, wood, vegetable oils, barley, leather, fish and wool 
concentrate almost 63% of total value of exports of goods  in 2007, and all the products 
present a value of the RCA index above the unit.
3  
Table 2. Main export products for Uruguay: share in total exports and revealed comparative 
advantage, 2007 
HS2  Description 
Share of total 
exports 
Revealed Comparative 
Advantage Index (RCA) 
02 Meat and edible meat offal  23.4  45.7 
04 Dairy products, eggs, honey  9.4  17.0 
10 Cereals  9.1  14.5 
41 Raw hides and skins and leather  8.1  217.6 
44 Wood and articles of wood  6.5  10.0 
51 Wool and animal hair  6.2  78.5 
12 Oil seed, ol. fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc  6.0  34.0 
87 Motor vehicles and parts  4.9  0.4 
27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products  4.9  2.3 
39 Plastics and articles thereof  4.9  2.1 
03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs  4.1  8.4 
11 Milling products, malt, starches, wheat gluten  2.5  64.0 
08 Edible fruit and nuts  2.3  7.0 
71 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc  2.2  4.3 
30 Pharmaceutical products  2.0  0.5 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Central Bank of Uruguay and Comtrade 
 
Demand for food products is usually less elastic to changes in income than demand for 
manufactures or durable goods, and as Freund (2008) has estimated, exports of food and 
beverages have been less impacted in context of global crisis
4. For these reasons, we might 
expect a lower impact on the reduction of world demand on Uruguayan export volumes as a 
consequence of the most recent crisis, However, there are two indirect associated effects that 
could result in larger real impacts: first, the impacts of the crisis in the MERCOSUR region - 
particularly Brazil, the main destination of Uruguayan exports, and second, the consequences 
of the crisis on global trade policy decisions in the developed economies. Given the importance 
of the export sector in the Uruguayan economy, significant reductions in exports would 
generate a negative impact on the level of activity and employment. 
                                                 
3 Following Balassa (1965), we compute the Revealed Comparative Advantage Index as follows:  
RCA = (Xiu/Xu)/(Xi/X), where Xiu/Xu is the share of product i (at HS 2 digit level) in total exports of 
Uruguay, and Xi/X is the share of product i in world exports. Values above the unit indicate that the 
country presents revealed comparative advantages in exports of the product.  
 
4 The author analyzes the impact on trade flows by commodity groups during four global downturn 
episodes: 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2001.   7 
  
Although 2008 ended up with the highest records of exports of goods, the upward trend of 
Uruguayan exports since the beginning of 2003 (first driven by the real depreciation of 2002 
and then by increasing international commodity prices) reversed sharply during the second 
half of 2008. With the deepening of the international crisis, the decrease in world and regional 
demand and the fall of commodity prices (see Figure 2) had a strong impact on Uruguayan 
exports.  
 
Figure 2. Recent evolution of international prices 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund. Index 2005=100 
 
Between July and December 2008, commodity prices fell by 32%, while in the same period 
Uruguayan exports fell by 18% (in US dollars) and 8% (in volume). The decrease in the value of 
exports reached 25% between July 2008 and April 2009 (see Figure 3). 
   8 
Figure 3. Exports (monthly values in current million US dollars) 
 
Source: Authors elaboration, based on data of the Uruguay Central Bank (BCU) 
 
The fall in international prices also affected the value of imports, which reached a peak in the 
second quarter of 2008 and fell pronouncedly in the three following quarters. The evolution of 
total imports was closely related to the evolution of oil imports, as Figure 4 shows.  
 
Figure 4. Quarterly imports in current million US dollars 
 
Source: Authors elaboration, based on data of the Uruguay Central Bank (BCU) 
 
2.2 External Financing Channel 
In the case of external financing, the "flight to quality," behavior, the reconstruction of global 
financial institutions and the increasing country risk of emerging economies during the crisis   9 
resulted in significant reversals of financial capital flows into emerging economies, causing 
severe decreases in portfolio investment, the most volatile category of the capital account of 
the balance of payments. Furthermore, the recession in the main economies with a 
consequent fall in aggregate world demand along with the increasing difficulties in access to 
financing, adversely affected the inflow of capital through foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
main component of the Uruguayan capital account.  
Table 3. Uruguay: Balance of payments and GDP (in millions of USD) 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Current Account  3  42  -392  -220  -1,486  212 
Exports  4,257  5,085  5,787  6,933  9,372  8,556 
Imports  3,778  4,693  5,877  6,775  10,270  7,794 
Net Rent and Transfers  -475  -350  -302  -378  -588  -551 
Capital Account  72  752  528  1,505  2,766  1,699 
Foreign Direct 
Investment  315  811  1,495  1,240  1,786  1,227 
Portfolio Investment  -422  806  1,686  1,151  -558  -710 
Other Investment  174  -869  -2,659  -889  1,537  1,182 
Errors & Omissions  379  -174  -152  -279  953  -322 
Reserves  -454  -620  15  -1,005  -2,232  -1,588 
             
GDP  13,268 17,398 20,064 24,302 32,193 32,146 
Ratio CA/GDP  0.0%  0.2%  -2.0%  -0.9%  -4.6%  0.7% 
Ratio FDI/GDP  2.4%  4.7%  7.4%  5.1%  5.5%  3.8% 
Source: Central Bank of Uruguay 
Table 3 describes the Uruguayan balance of payments. Two relevant aspects can be noted 
regarding the capital account. First, the significant reversal of portfolio investment recorded 
since 2008, which shows the quick reaction of these flows to changes in economic and 
financial conditions. Second, while FDI had shown an impressive growth between 2005 and 
2008 (it represented 2.4% of GDP in 2004 and increased up to 5.7% of GDP in 2008), and 
became one of the most important sources of growth in the last few years, the worsening of 
financial problems and its transmission to the real sector affected FDI decisions, causing 
stagnation in FDI flows into Uruguay. In 2009, the ratio FDI/GDP declined up to 3.8%.  
2.3. Remittances and aid flow channels 
As already mentioned, while the trade and the external financing channels might have played a 
role in transmitting the impact of the global financial crisis to the domestic economy, the 
remittances and aid flows are not significant channels of transmission in the case of Uruguay. 
Neither of both flows has represented more than 1 percent of GDP along the decade (see   10 
Table 4).
5  Besides, aid flows actually increased during 2009, both in absolute terms and 
relative to GDP; and even though remittances fell in 2009, the decline was slight.  
 
Table 4. Remittances and aid flows as percentage of GDP 
   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Remittances*  0.79  0.63  0.57  0.51  0.40  0.36 
Net aid**  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.10 
*Incoming remittances flows 
**Net official development assistance 
Source: own elaboration with data from FOMIN-IADB, OECD and Central Bank of Uruguay 
 
3. Model and dataset 
 
In order to analyze the impact of the recent economic and financial crisis on the 
Uruguayan economy, we apply a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and 
microsimulations. Even though the methodological tool is more appropriate to make 
ex ante evaluations, an ex post evaluation is interesting in this case because it allows 
to disentangle the different channels through which the crisis affected the Uruguayan 
economy, and also to evaluate policy responses to the crisis.  
 
3.1. PEP Standard model 
 
We apply the PEP standard model (PEP 1-1) (Decaluwé et al., 2009)). It is a single country static 
model
6 in which firms are assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Output 
in each firm is reached through a nested structure of production that combines value added 
and total intermediate consumption in fixed shares at the upper level. At the second level, 
each industry’s value added consists of composite labor and composite capital, following a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification. At the bottom level on the value added 
side, the various categories of labor are combined following a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) technology. Likewise, composite capital is a CES combination of the different 
categories of capital. As in the case of labor, it is assumed that different categories of capital 
                                                 
5 In Central American countries Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras remittances 
represented between 10 and 20% of GPD in 2010, while in some Sub-Saharan African countries, such as 
Malawi, aid flows can reach more than 10% of GDP, although this figure can change radically from one 
year to the next. 
6 The description of the model follows Decaluwé et al (2009), where a more complete presentation of 
the model, including its equations and assumptions, can be found.    11 
are imperfect substitutes. Aggregate intermediate consumption is made up of various goods 
and services, under the assumption that intermediate inputs are perfectly complementary, 
and are combined following a Leontief production function.  
 
There are four types of agents: households, firms, government and rest of the world. 
Household incomes come from three sources: labor income, capital income, and transfers 
received from other agents. Each household type receives a fixed share of earnings of each 
type of labor. Total capital income is also distributed between agents, including households, in 
fixed proportion. Finally, transfer income is simply the sum of all transfers received by each 
household type. Disposable income left after savings and transfers to other agents is entirely 
dedicated to consumption. Household savings are a linear function of disposable income. It is 
assumed that households have Stone-Geary utility functions (from which derives the Linear 
Expenditure System). This implies that there is a minimum level of consumption of each 
commodity (which may be zero for some commodities). 
 
Firms’ income consists of capital income and of transfers received from other agents (including 
the transfer part of interest on consumer debt). Government receives fiscal revenue through 
different types of taxes, and also receives part of the remuneration of capital and transfers 
from other agents. The rest of the world receives payments for the value of imports, part of 
capital income, and transfers from domestic agents. Foreign spending in the domestic 
economy consists of the value of exports, and transfers to domestic agents. The difference 
between foreign receipts and spending is the amount of rest-of-the-world savings, which are 
equal in absolute value to the current account balance, but with opposite sign. 
 
The demand for goods and services, whether domestically produced or imported, consists of 
household consumption demand, investment demand, demand by public administration, and 
demand as transport or trade margins. Investment demand includes both gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) and changes in inventories. 
 
In defining trade relations with the rest of the world, the model assumes the small country 
hypothesis: the world price of traded goods (imports and exports) is exogenous. However, the 
local producer is only able to increase his/her share of the world market by offering a lower 
price relative to the (exogenous) world price, depending on the price-elasticity of export 
demand. Producers’ supply behavior is represented by nested CET functions: on the upper   12 
level, aggregate output is allocated to individual products; on the lower level, the supply of 
each product is distributed between the domestic market and exports. 
 
Buyer behavior is symmetrical to producer behavior, in that it is assumed that local products 
are imperfect substitutes for imports. Thus, commodities demanded on the domestic market 
are composite goods, combinations of locally produced goods and imports. The imperfect 
substitutability between the two is represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
aggregator function. According to the small-country hypothesis, the price-elasticity of import 
supply is assumed to be infinite at the going world price.  
 
Supply and demand equilibrium is verified in goods and services market and in the factor 
market. Also, total investment expenditure must be equal to the sum of agents’ savings. The 
sum of supplies of every commodity by local producers must be equal to domestic demand for 
that commodity produced locally. Finally, supply to the export market of each good must be 
equal to demand. 
 3.2. Modifications to PEP Standard model 
Some modifications were introduced in order to adapt the model to the Uruguayan case and 
allow simulating the specific shocks the country received during the crisis, as well as the policy 
responses. First, we introduced unemployment in the labor market, through a wage curve that 
negatively relates unemployment and wages (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). This 
specification for labor market has been widely applied in CGE models (Carneiro and Arbache, 
2003; Terra et al, 2010, among others) and is consistent with the efficiency wage theory, which 
argues that in certain economies firms have an incentive to pay salaries above the average in 
order to promote higher efficiency or lower quit rate among workers. However, in a context of 
high unemployment, firms do not need to pay a high incentive, since workers are more prone 
to lose their jobs. Thus, the higher the unemployment rate in the economy, the lower the 
wage premiums and the average wage rate of the economy. The wage curve has been 
estimated empirically in several countries, including Uruguay. In this study, we take the 
estimated elasticities of wages to unemployment from Bucheli and Gonzalez (2007), who find 
that there is not a significant effect of unemployment on wages for skilled workers, but a 
significant wage curve relation exists for unskilled and semiskilled workers. The estimated 
elasticity is slightly higher for unskilled workers (-0,145) than the one estimated for semiskilled 
workers (-0,139).  
   13 
Second, we did not consider firms as separate agents of the model.  We made this 
simplification because we are not considering any change in fiscal policies affecting firms’ 
income (as changes in direct taxes on firms for example). Instead, we are only considering 
households, government and the rest of the world as relevant type of agents for this analysis.  
 
Third, we separated public and private investment, in the spirit of the dynamic version of the 
PEP Standard Model (PEP-1-t; see Decaluwé et al, 2010). This modification was necessary in 
order to evaluate the countercyclical public policies implemented by the government. For 
doing so, we also introduced a fourth modification, introducing unemployment insurance 
transfers, which are linked to the level of unemployment of the economy (automatic 
mechanism of response) by a parameter that allows us to simulate explicit changes in 
unemployment transfers from the government.  
 
Regarding factor substitutability, we assume producers have a low flexibility to adjust to 
shocks by changing the composition of their labor force in the very short term. Therefore, we 
use low values of elasticities of substitution between different types of labor and capital. We 
take estimations of elasticities of substitution between labor and capital for Uruguay from 
Cassoni (1998). The range of variation of this elasticity is estimated in [0.3, -1], and we are 
taking a value close to the lower bound (0.5). We assume capital is sector specific and labor is 
mobile across sectors. Armington elasticities are estimates for Uruguay taken from Flores 
(2008), and household income elasticities are taken from González (2003).  
 
A savings driven closure was adopted. Real investment is endogenous and follows available 
savings. The trade balance is exogenous and the real exchange rate is the equilibrating 
variable. Finally, regarding government balance, we assume real government consumption and 
tax rates are fixed, so savings equilibrate government accounts. This implies a last change to 
the PEP model, as we assumed government consumption of each commodity in real terms is 
fixed, instead of taking total government spending as fixed. 
3.3. Data and calibration 
For calibration purposes, we use a 2005 SAM for Uruguay based on the last recently published 
Tables of Supply and Use (Central Bank of Uruguay, 2005). The SAM has 55 activities, six types 
of labor according to formal education and sector of activity (agricultural/non-agricultural), 
and one type of capital. We consider agricultural labor to be sector-specific (in the three 
categories of formal education). Households are disaggregated into five types according to   14 
quintiles of household income.Even though other criteria is usually recommended for 
classification of households (see Decaluwe et al., 1999), this classification  is relevant for 
Uruguay because it allows differentiating very distinctive patterns of income and 
consumption
7. For example, households belonging to the poorest quintile receive their income 
mainly from transfers and unskilled labor wages, while households in the highest quintile of 
income obtain their income from capital income and skilled labor wages.  In any case, we 
analyze the impact on income distribution and poverty from a microsimulation analysis, which 
enriches the results from the CGE model.    
 
The main sources of data are the tables of supply and use 2005 (BCU), National Household 
Survey (NHS -INE) and the last Income and Consumption Survey (2006). The ample sectoral 
disaggregation of the SAM allows us to introduce specific price and demand shocks in the main 
export oriented goods and service sectors, as described in the previous section. We adapt the 
2005 SAM to the model requirements, mainly simplifying some accounts, such as taxes.  
 
We calibrate public investment using National Accounts data, unemployment transfers with 
information from the National Institute of Social Security (BPS), and percentage of unemployed 
receiving the insurance from the National Household Survey (ECH-INE). 
 
Table  5  presents the supply and demand structure for Uruguay at the baseline. In 2005, 
investment reached 16.5% of GDP, and the highest proportion corresponded to private 
investment. Government consumption was almost 11% of GDP, while private consumption 
was the main component of GDP, representing 72% at market prices.  
                                                 
7 Some of the criteria usually suggested is not relevant for the Uruguayan case; for example, the 
differentiation between urban and rural households, because rural households are negligible in Uruguay     15 
Table 5. GDP structure of Uruguay, 2005 
  Share of GDP (%) 
Household consumption  71.7 
Private investment  13.6 
Public investment  2.9 
Stock variation  1.2 
Government consumption  10.9 
Exports  26.9 
Imports  -27.2 
GDP market prices  100.0 
Net indirect taxes  13.3 
GDP at factor cost  86.7 
Source: SAM 
Production, export, import and value added structure for each aggregated sector are 
presented in Table 6. While service sectors represent 64% of total output and 74% of total 
value added of the economy, manufacturing sectors are more linked to the external sector, 
representing 74% of total exports and 85% of total imports. Food manufacturing sectors are 
more oriented to exports, while importing sectors are mostly other manufacturing sectors (see 
table A1 in Annex).  
Table 6. Production and trade structure by aggregated sectors (in %) 
  Output Value added Exports Imports 
Primary  8.50  10.61  7.17  2.18 
Food Manufacturing  11.95  6.19  39.22  24.98 
Other manufacturing  15.75  9.12  34.26  59.53 
Services  63.80  74.08  19.36  7.29 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: SAM 
Value added structure by sectors is remarkably different, as Table  7  shows. The main 
difference stands on the use of labor by skills: while service sectors are more intensive in the 
use of skilled labor, primary sectors are more intensive in unskilled labor.  
Table 7. Value added structure of aggregated sectors (in %) 
  Skilled labor Semi- skilled labor Unskilled labor Capital Total 
Primary  3.4  12.4  26.0  58.2  100 
Food Manufacturing  3.2  21.3  15.3  60.1  100 
Other manufacturing  8.2  31.3  14.6  45.9  100 
Services  14.8  29.2  13.3  42.6  100 
Total  12.3  27.1  14.9  45.7  100 
Source: SAM 
Household income structure is presented in Table 8. While the poorest households rely on 
income from unskilled labor and government transfers, richest quintiles receive their income 
mainly from capital and skilled labor. Unemployment transfers are more important for the   16 
middle segments of the population, which are more integrated in the labor market than 
poorest households, but face higher unemployment rates than the richest households.  
Table 8. Household income by main source (in %) 
  Poorest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Richest quintile 
Skilled labor  3.9  4.3  6.1  9.5  14.4 
Semi-skilled labor  23.5  29.0  32.2  30.9  17.6 
Unskilled labor  38.0  28.8  20.2  13.2  5.0 
Capital  17.0  21.0  23.9  29.8  53.9 
Households transfers  1.4  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.5 
Government transfers  16.0  15.8  16.6  15.6  8.5 
Unemployment benefits  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: SAM 
Government consumption structure is presented in Table 9, both for final consumption and 
investment demand. Final consumption is in few services sectors, mainly government services 
and public services such as education and health. On the other hand, public investment is 
highly concentrated in construction sector, and to a less extent in metal products and services 
and other manufactures.  
Table 9. Government consumption structure (in %) 
  Current consumption 
Government services  48.8 
Education  24.5 
Health  23.4 
Financial services  1.8 
Other services  1.6 
  Investment demand 
Construction  54.5 
Metal products  25.1 
Business services  6.3 
Vehicles and parts  4.9 
Other manufactures  2.0 
Other services  1.6 
Other goods  5.6 
Source: SAM 
3.4. Scenarios 
With the aim of analyzing the effects of the world economic and financial crisis in Uruguay we 
simulate the two main channels through which the crisis has affected the Uruguayan economy: 
the trade and the external financing channel. 
  
Trade scenarios   17 
As already introduced, the global crisis affected exports through two main channels: a fall in 
external demand and a fall in international prices. Of the main 13 export sectors in Uruguay, 
which account for more than 2.5% of total exports separately and 65% of total export at the 
benchmark, 9 sectors experienced a fall in the export value between the first half of 2008 and 
the first half of 2009 (see Table 10). In some of them the decline was very important –such as 
leather, wood, textiles, meat and refined oil. 
 
The fall in exports measured in current prices can be explained by two phenomena: a fall in 
prices or a fall in quantities (demand). In order to disentangle these two effects, we analyzed 
the evolution of prices of these goods. In the case of commodities, we took the price variation 
reported by the IMF; while in the case of industrial goods, we took the exports price index 
reported by the Uruguay Chamber of Industry (CIU). Dairy food prices were taken from USDA. 
IMF reports prices at a disaggregated level, while some of the sectors included in our SAM are 
composed by several different products. In these cases, in order to compute the price change 
for the whole sector, we estimated the weighted average price change of the different 
products that are included in each sector.  
 
In the case of most industrial non-food sectors and services, we assumed a demand shock. As 
these sectors are mainly oriented to the MERCOSUR area, the size of the shock is equal to a 
weighted average of the demand fall in our main trade partners, Argentina and Brazil.   
  
Table 10. Simulated shocks in manufacturing export sectors 
Description 











Meat processing  19.23  -28.53  -3.1  Price 
Refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  6.41  -46.18  -52.2  Price 
Leather products  5.24  -41.77  -15.9  Price 
Dairy products  5.23  -19.42  -51.9  Price 
Sugar  4.99  44.32  -8.2  Price 
Rice processing  4.24  35.75  -19.6  Price 
Textiles  3.88  -34.72  -38.9  Price 
Cereals and other primary  3.24  18.09  -29.3  Price 
Fish products  2.91  3.34  -6.7  Price 
Basic Chemicals  2.81  -26.86  -1.0  Quantity 
Rubber and plastic  2.97  -12.86  -1.0  Quantity 
Metal products and machinery  2.82  -18.36  -1.0  Quantity 
Passenger transport  9.80  n/d  -1.0  Quantity 
Source: IMF, Chamber of Industries of Uruguay 
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Together with the negative price or demand shock on export sectors, the country also received 
a positive external shock as the international prices of the main import commodities also fell 
as a consequence of the crisis. Therefore, the price shock scenario combines the fall in 
international prices of the main export products and also of the main import products (mainly 
oil). Variation of prices of import products was taken from IMF and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(US). 
















Crude petroleum and natural gas  18.03  -46.4  -49.3  Price 
Refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  4.2  -64.3  -52.2  Price 
Source: IMF, USDA 
 
In sum, we simulate the trade transmission channel through a price shock and an external 
demand scenario, taking the actual changes in international prices of key exports and imports 
and fall in demand of main trade partners between 2008 and 2009. Given that the ratio 
between exports and final global demand experienced only a minor change between 2005 (our 
benchmark) and 2008, we did not rescale the shocks.
8  
 
External financing restrictions scenario 
Regarding the external financing channel, we simulate the negative financial restriction from 
the rest of the world via a negative shock in the rest of the world’s savings. We took the 
reduction of FDI (the most important and structural part of capital inflows) to estimate the 
magnitude of the shock. FDI declined 48% between June 2008 and June 2009. We choose to 
simulate this shock via an equivalent reduction of the current account balance.  
 
Crisis scenario 
The external financing restriction scenario is combined with the trade shock scenario in order 
to try to replicate the external shock that the country faced in the second half of 2008 (Crisis 
scenario). 
 
Policy response scenarios 
Despite the deterioration of fiscal performance, the financial situation of the public sector did 
not appear as a significant source of vulnerability. The ratio gross public debt to GDP 
                                                 
8 The ratio Exports/Final Demand was 23.6% and 21.4% in 2005 and 2008, respectively.    19 
decreased considerably in the last four years, now being around 50% (in 2002 it was 100% of 
GDP). So, in practice, the government has allowed an increase in public deficit rather than 
cutting government spending (which would have implied a pro cyclical response). 
 
Public consumption and investment increased 11% and 20% respectively, implying a clear 
countercyclical movement. We simulate the increase in these two components, first separately 
and then together. Since the adopted fiscal measures did not imply an increase in taxes, we 
simulate these scenarios contemplating an increase in public spending and allowing a broader 
fiscal deficit.  
 
In addition, some “automatic devices” are turned on in downward economic cycles, as 
unemployment insurance. Although most up to 2005 studies indicate a relatively low coverage 
of unemployment insurance in Uruguay, formal employment has increased considerably 
during the last four years, mainly due to the re installation of collective wage bargaining. So, 
reasonably, unemployment insurance coverage is expected to act as a compensatory policy for 
a larger proportion of workers than it did in past years. Furthermore, as a compensatory policy 
to the crisis, the government temporarily extended the period of coverage of the 
unemployment insurance and modified benefit rates
9. The observed facts for Uruguay indicate 
a rise in unemployment insurance requests and in unemployment insurance coverage during 
the crisis climax (September, 2008 – March, 2009). Thus, as a third countercyclical policy, we 
simulate a 15% increase in the coverage rate of unemployment insurance.  
 
The three policy response scenarios are simulated together with the crisis scenario (trade 
shock and external financing shock altogether). A last scenario that simulates the three policy 
scenarios together with the crisis scenario tries to replicate the main economic facts during the 
economic crisis.  
 
The simulated scenarios are summarized in the following table.  
                                                 
9 Benefits were increased the first months of the unemployment period and then gradually 
decreased.      20 
Table 12. Simulation scenarios 
Name  Brief description of scenario  Variable/parameter 
shocked 
Crisis shocks 
1.  International prices 
(PRICE) 
Export price fall in primary activities 
and food, textiles and leather 
manufacturing 
PWX 
Import price fall in petroleum  PWM 
2.  External demand 
(DEMD) 
 
Fall in external demand of basic 
chemicals, rubber and plastic, metal 
products and transport 
EXD 
3.  Trade (TRADE)  International prices + External 
demand 
 
4.  Finance (FIN)  External financing restriction: 48% 
fall 
CAB 
5.  Crisis (CRISIS)  Trade + Finance   
Policy response shocks 
6.  Government 
consumption (PUBCON) 
Crisis + 11% increase in real public 
consumption of commodities 
CG 
7.  Public investment 
(PUBINV) 
Crisis + 20% increase in public 
investment 
ITPUB 
8.  Unemployment benefits 
(UNBEN) 
Crisis  + 15% increase in 
unemployment benefit coverage 
rate 
bdelta 
9.  Complete policy 
response (PUBTOT) 
Crisis + Pubsp + Pubinv + Unben   
 
 
4. Results  
 
We first present and analyze results on main macroeconomic aggregates. Then, we focus on 
the sectoral impact and the effects on the labor and capital markets. Finally, we analyze the 
impact of the crisis on households’ income and poverty and income distribution. 
  
4.1 Macro results 
 
Table 13 shows results for the main macroeconomic aggregates. The first column presents the 
base values for national accounts (in millions of Uruguayan pesos), price indices and fiscal 
variables (as a percentage of GDP). Columns (2) to (6) present variations of these indicators 
(with respect to the base scenario) for all the crisis scenarios. Finally, columns (7) to (10) 
present results derived from the full crisis simulation plus the alternative (and full) policy 
responses presented above.  
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The global crisis gives a 1.4 % decrease of real GDP, mainly explained by the trade channel. The 
fall in export and import prices, which were actually the largest external crisis shocks, mainly 
explain the negative results of the TRADE scenario (see PRICE column in Table 12). The world 
demand restriction for Uruguay was of a much smaller magnitude, so its effects on macro 
aggregates would have been practically negligible (DEM column in Table 12). The TRADE 
simulation provokes a 1.2% reduction of GDP at market prices, a 3.7% reduction of exports, 
and a 1.5% reduction in fixed investment. The fall in export prices provokes a reduction of 
exports leading to a decrease in production and factor demand of main export sectors, and 
therefore leading to a reduction in employment, wages and capital returns. The fall of 
production in export sectors also leads to a decrease in government indirect tax revenues.  
 
Therefore, government income and savings fall, leading to a reduction in transfers to 
households (recall that in all the crisis simulations with no policy response we are keeping 
government consumption fixed). All these facts lead to a decline of household income and 
savings, consequently reducing private investment (recall we adopted a savings driven 
closure). Household real consumption keeps stable, because of the fall in consumer prices.  
 
Table 13. Main Macro Indicators by Simulation 
   Base                 PRICE  DEMD TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
National Accounts (million 
Uruguayan pesos)     Real percentage change with respect to base values 
HH Consumption  304,628  0.4  -0.1  0.3 -0.3  0.0  0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Fixed Investment  70,330  -1.1  -0.2  -1.5 -1.7  -3.1  -8.8  -3.5  -3.8  -9.4 
Government Consumption  46,478  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.0  0.0  0.0  11.0 
Exports   114,467  -3.6  0.0  -3.7  0.1  -3.6  -4.4  -3.7  -3.7  -4.5 
Imports  -115,778  0.8  -0.1  0.5 -0.8  -0.2  -0.6  -0.5  -0.6  -1.0 
GDP (market prices)  425,018  -1.1  0.0  -1.2 -0.2  -1.4  -1.1  -1.5  -1.5  -1.3 
Net Indirect Taxes  56,450  -2.2  -0.1  -2.3 -0.4  -2.7  -3.0  -2.8  -2.9  -3.2 
GDP (factor cost)  368,569  -0.9  0.0  -1.0 -0.2  -1.2  -0.8  -1.3  -1.3  -1.0 
Prices (base=100)     Real percentage change with respect to base values 
Consumer Price Index  100  -4.5  -0.1  -4.8 -0.8  -5.4  -3.9  -5.7  -5.8  -4.3 
Real Exchange Rate  100  5.5  0.1  5.7  0.6  6.3  5.1  6.5  6.6  5.5 
Terms of Trade  100  4.4  -0.1  4.2 -0.3  4.0  4.4  3.8  3.7  4.1 
Fiscal (% GDP)     % GDP 
Government savings  7.0  6.4  7.0  6.4  6.9  6.3  5.2  6.2  6.2  5.1 
Government consumption  10.9  11.1  10.9  11.1 11.0  11.1  12.3  11.1  11.1  12.3 
Government transfers  10.2  9.9  10.2  9.9 10.2  9.8  9.9  9.8  9.8  9.9 
Government income  28.1  27.0  28.1  26.9 27.9  26.7  27.2  26.6  26.6  27.0 
Source: own results from the CGE model 
 
The full CRISIS scenario leads to slightly worse results. A financial restriction, simulated by a cut 
in the rest of the world’s savings is added to the mechanisms described above. The reduction   22 
of foreign savings has an additional negative effect in investment (see FIN scenario in Table 
13). Consequently, the CRISIS scenario leads to a similar reduction of exports than the TRADE 
scenario, but a stronger reduction of in fixed investment (3.1%), leading to a 1.4% reduction of 
GDP.
10            
 
Columns (7) to (10) of Table 13 show the results with alternative policy instruments applied by 
the Uruguayan government during the crisis. In the PUBCON simulation we replicate the CRISIS 
scenario, but we simultaneously allow government consumption to increase 11% in real terms. 
This policy slightly reduces GDP fall (GDP falls by 1.1% while in the CRISIS scenario it fell 1.4%). 
The increase in government consumption leads to a substantial decrease in government 
savings (they reach 5.2% of GDP) thus reducing available savings in the economy and 
consequently, investment (fixed investment falls 8.8%). Another consequence of the increase 
in government consumption is a lower decline in consumer prices and real exchange rate 
depreciation (compared to the CRISIS scenario), thus provoking a greater reduction of exports 
(4.4%).  
 
The PUBINV scenario keeps government consumption fixed and instead allows a 20% increase 
in public investment. In this case, the increase in public investment tends to crowd out private 
investment, so total fixed investment falls, slightly more than in the CRISIS scenario. This result 
derives from the reduction of available savings in the economy (government and household 
savings decrease, and recall our model closure is savings driven). Note that this result could 
change in a dynamic setting, if we introduced other options of financing public investment, like 
foreign borrowing. In that case, the crowd-out effect would not necessarily take place in the 
short (or medium) run.   
 
The UNBEN scenario keeps government consumption fixed, and allows an increase in 
unemployment benefits. This reduces government savings and consequently has a negative 
impact on investment, fact that counteracts the initial positive effect on household income 
derived from the increase in unemployment transfers. The overall macro effect of the PUBINV 
and UNBEN is a GDP reduction of 1.5%, very similar to the one of the CRISIS scenario with no 
policy response.   
 
                                                 
10 These results are consistent with the short-term impact of the crisis, when GDP, exports and 
investment declined significantly, as shown in the first chapter.   23 
Finally, the PUBTOT scenario combines the three policy instruments described above (increase 
in public consumption, public investment and unemployment benefits). The result is a very 
slight effect on GDP compared to the crisis scenario (-1.3%, vs. -1.4%), although the demand 
composition varies significantly. This scenario implies an important increase in participation of 
public consumption and a significant reduction of public savings and overall investment. It also 
leads to an additional decrease in trade flows (exports and imports) and a lower real 
depreciation, compared to the CRISIS scenario.  
 
4.2 Sectoral results 
 
Table 14 presents sectoral results from all the simulations. We focus in export, import and 
value added variations. To facilitate presentation we aggregate sectors in primary, food 
manufacturing, other manufacturing, construction and services. The complete tables with 
disaggregated sectors are presented in the Annex. 
 
Table 14. Sectoral results. Value added, export and imports, by simulation (aggregated 
sectors) 
      Crisis Scenarios  Crisis + Policy Scenarios 
   BASE  PRICE DEM TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
Value Added 
 (million Uruguayan pesos)  Real percentage change with respect to base values 
Primary  32,444  -1.9  0.0  -1.9  0.0  -2.0  -1.9  -2.0  -2.0  -2.0 
Food Manufacturing  18,913  -3.6  0.0  -3.6  0.0  -3.5  -3.4  -3.5  -3.5  -3.4 
Other Manufacturing  27,886  0.1  -0.1  -0.2 -0.4  -0.4  -1.5  -0.7  -0.8  -1.8 
Construction  19,296  0.1  -0.1  -0.1 -1.2  -1.4  -5.6  -1.7  -1.9  -6.1 
Public services, education 
and health 
38,843  -0.2  0.0  -0.3 -0.1  -0.4  5.6  -0.4  -0.4  5.5 
Other services  168,353  -1.0  0.0  -1.0 -0.1  -1.2  -1.5  -1.2  -1.3  -1.6 
Exports  
 (million Uruguayan pesos)  Real percentage change with respect to base values 
Primary  8,204  -4.2  0.0  -4.2  0.1  -4.1  -4.4  -4.1  -4.1  -4.4 
Food Manufacturing  44,891  -5.0  0.0  -4.9  0.3  -4.7  -5.1  -4.7  -4.6  -5.0 
Other Manufacturing  39,212  -5.8  -0.1  -5.9  0.0  -5.9  -6.9  -6.0  -6.1  -7.1 
Public services, education 
and health  107  1.7  0.1  1.8  0.3  2.1  6.6  2.3  2.3  6.8 
Other services  22,054  3.3  -0.2  2.9 -0.1  3.0  1.5  2.7  2.5  1.0 
Imports  
(million Uruguayan pesos)  Real percentage change with respect to base values 
Primary  23,398  7.8  -0.1  7.7 -0.4  7.3  6.7  7.1  7.0  6.5 
Food Manufacturing  8,234  -3.0  -0.1  -3.2 -0.6  -3.7  -2.8  -4.0  -4.0  -3.1 
Other Manufacturing  69,917  -0.3  -0.1  -0.6 -0.9  -1.4  -2.2  -1.8  -1.9  -2.7 
Other services  14,229  -3.5  -0.2  -3.8 -0.7  -4.4  -3.7  -4.7  -4.9  -4.1 
Source: own results from the CGE model 
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In the TRADE scenario, production and exports of the primary and food manufacturing sectors 
fall, due to the reduction of prices. The most negatively affected exports (in volume) would be 
dairy products, basic textiles, leather products, rice processing, cereals and the oil refinery. 
While exports of other manufactures also fall, total production keeps practically stable, as 
domestic demand is a major final destination of this sector. On the other hand, the real 
exchange rate depreciation has a positive impact in export of services, which tend to increase, 
more than compensating the negative impact of the reduction of the foreign demand. The fall 
in international prices also leads to an increase in imports in the primary sector, entirely 
explained by the increase of imports in the mining sector (linked to the fall of oil prices) (see 
Table A.4). The external balance restriction imposes an import reduction in all the other 
aggregated sectors. The fall in exports leads to a decline in production of all the above sectors 
except the oil refinery, which actually increases production oriented to the domestic market. 
This is explained by the fall in prices of crude oil, a main input of the sector.      
 
The full CRISIS scenario also shows a negative impact on production of the construction sector 
and a major decline in imports of other manufactures. Both facts are linked to the fall in 
investment, provoked by the foreign savings restriction (see FIN scenario).  
 
When we allow public consumption to increase in response to the crisis (PUBCON scenario), 
the major changes with respect to the CRISIS scenario are a decline in production of the 
construction sector, a greater reduction of production and imports of other manufactures, and 
an increase in value added of public services, education and health. The first two facts are a 
consequence of the significant reduction of investment, derived from the reduction of 
government savings. On the other hand, the government consumption expansion derives in 
the significant increase in public services, education and health, as public consumption is 
concentrated in these activities. Finally, exports of primary and manufacturing sectors decline 
more than in the CRISIS scenario, linked to the lower real depreciation.  
 
In contrast, the scenario where we allow public investment in to increase (PUBINV scenario), 
sectoral results are very similar to the ones of the CRISIS scenario. This fact is linked to the 
relatively low participation of public investment in total aggregate demand, and the crowd out 
effect on private investment. The scenario of increased unemployment benefits (UNBEN 
scenario) shows similar results, mostly derived from the fall in government savings and 
consequently, investment.  
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Finally, when we simultaneously allow the three public responses to the crisis, the sectoral 
results are in general worse than the scenario with only public consumption increase. In 
particular, we find a greater decline of the construction sector, derived from a greater fall in 
investment. This last fact is linked to the crowd out effect and the additional reduction of 
government savings linked to the increase in transfers.   
 
    4.3 Factor market results 
 
Table 15 displays the labor demand, wages and unemployment variations under the different 
simulated scenarios, as well as variations in returns to capital. Labor indicators are presented 
by type (considering skill and being employed in the agriculture sector).  
 
Table 15. Factor Market results. Labor demand, wages, unemployment and returns to 
capital, by simulation  
   Crisis Scenarios  Crisis + Policy Scenarios 
   PRICE DEM TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
Labour demand (mill Ury pesos)  Percentage change with respect to base values 
Skilled labour, agriculture  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Semi-skilled labour, agriculture  -2.3  0.0  -2.4 -0.2  -2.6  -2.3  -2.6  -2.7  -2.4 
Unskilled labour, agriculture  -5.5  0.0  -5.6 -0.1  -5.7  -5.5  -5.8  -5.8  -5.6 
Skilled labour, non agriculture  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Semi -skilled labour, non agriculture  -1.9  -0.1  -2.1 -0.5  -2.5  -1.7  -2.7  -2.8  -2.0 
Unskilled labour, non agriculture  -1.8  -0.1  -2.0 -0.6  -2.6  -2.5  -2.8  -2.9  -2.9 
Wage rate (base=100)  Percentage change with respect to base values 
Skilled labour, agriculture  -4.8  -0.1  -4.9 -0.4  -5.3  -5.3  -5.4  -5.5  -5.5 
Semi-skilled labour, agriculture  -2.7  0.0  -2.8 -0.2  -2.9  -2.7  -3.0  -3.0  -2.7 
Unskilled labour, agriculture  -6.9  0.0  -7.0 -0.2  -7.1  -6.9  -7.2  -7.2  -7.0 
Skilled labour, non agriculture  -4.3  -0.3  -4.9 -1.4  -6.1  0.6  -6.6  -6.9  -0.2 
Semi -skilled labour, non agriculture  -2.0  -0.1  -2.2 -0.5  -2.6  -1.9  -2.8  -2.9  -2.1 
Unskilled labour, non agriculture  -1.6  -0.1  -1.8 -0.6  -2.3  -2.2  -2.4  -2.5  -2.5 
Unemployment rate  Percentage change with respect to base values 
Semi-skilled labour, agriculture  2.1  0.0  2.1  0.1  2.3  2.0  2.3  2.4  2.1 
Unskilled labour, agriculture  5.1  0.0  5.2  0.1  5.3  5.2  5.4  5.4  5.2 
Semi -skilled labour, non agriculture  1.6  0.1  1.8  0.4  2.2  1.5  2.4  2.5  1.8 
Unskilled labour, non agriculture  1.5  0.1  1.7  0.5  2.3  2.2  2.5  2.6  2.5 
   Percentage change with respect to base values 
Capital returns  -4.4  -0.2  -4.8 -1.0  -5.7  -4.7  -6.2  -6.3  -5.3 
Source: own results from CGE model 
 
The fall of international prices ok key Uruguayan exports leads to a decline of labor demand, of 
semi skilled and unskilled workers, which is somewhat more pronounced in the agriculture 
sector.
11  This is consistent with the fact that primary and food manufacturing sector (strongly 
                                                 
11 Recall we assume no unemployment of skilled labour, so adjustments in this segment are reflected 
entirely in wage variations.   26 
linked to the agriculture sector) are the most affected by the international price decline. 
Wages (in terms of the nominal exchange rate) of all types of labor also fall, but the reduction 
is particularly important in the case of skilled workers (in which all the adjustment is via wages) 
and unskilled workers of the agriculture sector, in which case the reduction is of a greater 
magnitude than the one of the consumer prices. Reduction of labor  demand leads to an 
increase in unemployment rates, particularly significant in the case of unskilled agriculture 
workers (5.5 percentage points). In sum, although the fall in export and import prices 
negatively affects all types of workers, the most affected would be unskilled workers of the 
agriculture sector, as they would experience a significant reduction of wages and a large 
increase in unemployment. The main trade partners´ demand restriction has small negative 
impact, mainly on non-agriculture type of labor  (recall demand restriction is channeled 
through manufactures and services).  
 
The cut in foreign savings has some negative impacts in labor demand and wages, especially in 
non-agriculture labor. Unemployment slightly increases between semi skilled and unskilled 
workers, while skilled non-agriculture workers are negatively affected by a real wage rate 
reduction.  The full CRISIS scenario has negative consequences in all types of labor and capital. 
Unskilled workers in agriculture are the most affected (via reduction of wages and increase in 
unemployment). Semi skilled workers as well as unskilled workers in non-agriculture sectors 
are mostly affected by increase in unemployment. The negative impact for skilled workers is 
through a reduction of real wages.
12 Finally, capital returns fall by 5.7%. 
   
The increase in public consumption response has a strong positive impact on remunerations of 
skilled non-agriculture workers. This is a consequence of the composition of government 
consumption, mainly directed to public services, education and health, which are all skilled 
intensive, especially the last two (see table A.1). It also has a positive effect on semi skilled 
non-agriculture workers, reducing unemployment growth and decline of wages with respect to 
the crisis scenario. As for all the other labor  types, public consumption expansion has 
practically no effect, compared to the CRISIS scenario (see Table 15). An increase in public 
investment and an increase in unemployment benefits slightly reinforce the negative effects of 
the CRISIS, for all types of workers, linked to the negative total investment effect. So the 
simultaneous implementation of the three policies actually worsens (slightly) labor demand 
                                                 
12 Again, this result is linked to the assumption of no unemployment of skilled workers. In Uruguay, 
unemployment of skilled workers is very low, probably linked to frictional unemployment.    27 
and unemployment of unskilled non-agriculture workers, and mostly benefits skilled and 
semiskilled non agriculture workers.  
  
4.3 Household income results 
 
The global crisis has a negative effect on households’ income (in terms of nominal exchange 
rate), disregarding the income quintile. The fall is higher for household belonging to the 
poorest quintile, but the less harmed households are in the upper tier but in the middle 
segments. Again, the main negative shock is through the trade channel. Under the trade shock 
scenario, income falls 5.3% for households belonging to the poorest quintile and 4.7% for 
richest households. Poorest households (the ones of the first quintile) are the ones that face a 
real income reduction, as their income decline is stronger than the consumer price fall. The 
negative impact on poorest households is related to the higher impact of this scenario on 
unskilled wages in agriculture sector, where poorest households are concentrated. On the 
contrary, the external financing scenario affects richer households stronger, because under 
this scenario, it is skilled wages and capital that are more affected. The effect on income under 
this scenario is around 1% for all quintiles, but implies a real income fall in all cases, as 
consumer prices fall very slightly in this scenario. The combination of both shocks (CRISIS 
scenario), gives a real income fall in the poorest and richest households, but particularly strong 
in the poorest quintile. Thus we might expect an increase in poverty (and perhaps, inequality).  
 
Of the three policies implemented by the government, only the increase in public consumption 
mitigates the fall in income for all households, although the benefit is higher for richer 
households. We should keep in mind that the public consumption increase goes to sectors that 
use more intensively skilled labor. An increase in public investment and an increase in 
unemployment benefits actually reinforce (slightly) the fall in households’ income, and again 
the most harmed households are the poorest ones.  
 
The net result of the implementation of the three policies, compared to the crisis scenario 
without policy response, is a lower fall in income, provoked by the increase in public 
consumption, a policy that despite being effective in counteracting the negative effects of the 
crisis, is strictly regressive (the benefit increases along the income distribution).  
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Table 16. Household income results 
   Crisis Scenarios  Crisis + Policy Scenarios 
  
PRICE  DEM TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
Percentage change with respect to base values 
Total income 
                HH-1  -4.9  -0.2  -5.3 -0.9  -6.0  -5.0  -6.4  -6.5  -5.5 
HH-2  -4.4  -0.2  -4.8 -1.0  -5.6  -4.4  -6.0  -6.1  -4.9 
HH-3  -4.2  -0.2  -4.6 -1.0  -5.5  -4.1  -5.8  -5.9  -4.6 
HH-4  -4.2  -0.2  -4.6 -1.0  -5.4  -3.8  -5.8  -6.0  -4.3 
HH-5  -4.3  -0.2  -4.7 -1.1  -5.6  -3.7  -6.0  -6.2  -4.3 
Labor income 
                HH-1  -5.2  -0.2  -5.6 -0.9  -6.4  -5.5  -6.7  -6.9  -6.0 
HH-2  -4.5  -0.2  -4.9 -1.0  -5.7  -4.6  -6.1  -6.3  -5.1 
HH-3  -4.2  -0.2  -4.6 -1.1  -5.5  -3.9  -5.8  -6.0  -4.5 
HH-4  -4.0  -0.2  -4.5 -1.1  -5.4  -3.4  -5.8  -6.0  -4.0 
HH-5  -4.1  -0.2  -4.6 -1.2  -5.5  -2.3  -6.0  -6.2  -3.0 
Source: own results from CGE model 
 
4.5 Poverty and inequality results 
In order to analyze the effect of some of the scenarios on poverty and income distribution, we 
complemented the analysis with microsimulations. We apply the methodology proposed in 
Vos et al (2006). It is  a top-down approach that takes the results of the CGE model on 
unemployment rates, employment, wage rates, returns to capital and consumer prices and 
feeds them into a microsimulation module with data from Continuous Household Survey for 
Uruguay for 2005.  Table 17  reports the value of poverty headcount, extreme poverty 
headcount and Gini index for benchmark and the effects of the crisis scenario, the policy 
response of increase in public spending and the scenario with the three policy responses.  
 
The financial crisis affects poverty through two opposite effects. On one hand, as presented 
before, income falls. However, on the other hand, consumer prices fall, and so does poverty 
lines. The net result is an increase in extreme poverty by 7%, and a slight fall in poverty. The 
negative effect of a fall in income for poorest households prevails over the positive effect of a 
fall in consumer prices. The already poor population is the most affected by the crisis. The 
effect on income distribution is negative but slight.  
 
Table 17. Effects on poverty and income distribution 
   Value 2005 Effect of scenarios (% change) 
CRISIS  CRISISG  CRISIST 
Poverty headcount  29.23  -2.2  -0.6  -0.8 
Extreme poverty headcount  3.78  6.9  8.6  9.2 
Gini index  0.452  0.6  1.4  1.4 
Source: Microsimulation results 
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Public responses do not contribute to improve poverty and income distribution indicators. As a 
matter of fact, all poverty and inequality indicators worsen with respect to the scenario of the 
crisis with no policy response. Extreme poverty increases more and poverty falls less. Even 
though the increase in public consumption policy has a positive effect on private income, 
under this scenario prices fall less, and this explains the worsening of poverty indicators. This 
policy turns out to be regressive, and under this scenario income distribution worsens.  
 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks  
 
This paper uses a static computable general equilibrium model linked to a microsimulation 
model to analyze how the global crisis and different adopted policy responses may have 
affected the Uruguayan economy. The focus is on the trade and foreign flows channel, since 
they are the most important mechanisms through which the global crisis affected the 
Uruguayan economy. In this way, we mainly simulated the crisis through price reduction of key 
export and import sectors; a demand reduction coming from our main trade partners 
(Argentina and Brazil); and a foreign savings restriction via a  cut in the current account 
balance. As well as running the full crisis simulation, we also analyzed each channel separately, 
in order to disentangle their effects. 
 
We then simulated the full crisis scenario jointly with three policy responses (increase public 
consumption by 11%, increase in public investment by 20%, and increase in unemployment 
benefits (15% coverage rate)). In the same fashion as in the crisis simulation we opted to run 
the simultaneous three policy responses as well as each one separately. 
  
In general, we find the crisis had a strong impact on exports and fixed investment, result that is 
consistent with what actually happened in the Uruguayan economy during the first year after 
the beginning of the crisis
13. Reduction of exports derived from the simulated price and 
demand shocks and the foreign savings restriction would lead to a 1.4% reduction of GDP. 
Poorest households would be the most affected, as they face a stronger reduction in real 
wages and a rise in unemployment. This is linked to the fact that output contraction is mainly 
                                                 
13 Between the third quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009, exports fell by 15% and private 
investment declined 2.7%.     
   30 
focused on trade sectors, especially those related to primary and food manufactures, which 
are mostly unskilled labor intensive.   
 
The global crisis increases extreme poverty. The negative effect of a fall in income for poorest 
households is not counteracted by the fall in consumer prices. However, this last fact does 
seem to positively affect poverty headcount, which actually falls under the crisis scenario. 
Decline in prices would have a positive effect on households below (but near) the poverty line, 
not so much affected by reduction of wages and rise of unemployment.  
 
It seems that the policy response based on increasing public current consumption does 
(moderately) counteract some negative impacts of the crisis, but it is regressive, as the 
benefits increase along the income distribution. Besides, it is not directed towards the most 
harmed by the crisis (unskilled, mainly agriculture and food manufacturing workers). 
Government consumption is directed to skilled labor-intensive activities, so skilled workers are 
the most benefited with this type of policy. A general increase in public investment and 
unemployment benefits do not seem to act as countercyclical policies.  
 
Nevertheless, we have to remark that we have not analyzed other options of financing the 
increased government consumption, investment or transfers. Increased investment could have 
been financed by increasing external public debt, fact that was actually exploited by the 
Uruguayan government, as the economy had substantially lowered the ratio debt/GDP during 
the years prior to the global crisis. In this case, the crowd out effects and the savings restriction 
may not act in the short and medium run, and results could be certainly different. 
 
Finally, simulation results suggest that poorer households are the most harmed by this type of 
crisis. This highlights the importance of counting with specific policies aimed at counteracting 
the negative impact on this population. 
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Annex 
Table A 1.  Value added and exports structure in Uruguay at the baseline (2005)   






labor  Capital Total 
Primary 
Rice  0.6  0.0  0.0  2.5  19.8  77.7  100 
Other cereals  0.8  3.2  4.9  9.9  20.6  64.6  100 
Vegetables  0.5  0.0  2.7  28.3  49.3  19.8  100 
Fruit  0.6  1.5  5.1  13.8  27.1  54.1  100 
Raw milk  1.1  0.0  0.0  10.3  61.5  28.2  100 
Livestock  5.6  0.7  4.0  11.6  20.4  64.0  100 
Poultry  0.3  0.3  6.9  39.4  39.1  14.6  100 
Forestry  0.6  1.2  1.8  4.5  9.4  84.4  100 
Fishing  0.3  0.1  6.1  27.5  25.0  41.4  100 
Mining  0.2  0.1  1.3  7.7  9.0  82.0  100 
Food Manufacturing  
Meat processing  1.5  19.2  2.0  17.0  16.3  64.7  100 
Fish products  0.5  2.9  0.5  20.5  15.5  63.4  100 
Other food industry  0.1  0.1  2.8  15.6  11.1  70.4  100 
Vegetable oils  0.0  0.0  6.1  7.6  20.1  66.2  100 
Dairy products  1.0  5.2  3.9  28.4  14.7  53.0  100 
Rice processing  0.2  4.2  3.9  26.6  17.5  52.0  100 
Mills  0.1  0.1  0.0  41.2  45.9  12.9  100 
Animal food  0.1  0.1  2.4  11.8  17.2  68.5  100 
Bread and pasta  0.7  0.1  7.9  45.5  35.3  11.4  100 
Sugar  1.2  5.0  1.3  6.1  3.6  88.9  100 
Wine  0.1  0.1  7.7  25.5  30.3  36.5  100 
Beverages from barley  0.2  1.6  1.9  23.2  8.4  66.5  100 
Other beverages  0.4  0.0  5.4  19.8  9.7  65.0  100 
Tobacco  0.1  0.5  8.1  28.5  12.6  50.8  100 
Other manufacturing 
Basic Textiles  0.7  3.9  8.7  14.0  7.0  70.3  100 
Other textiles  0.1  0.6  4.4  60.5  30.4  4.7  100 
Clothing  0.7  1.4  4.9  33.2  20.5  41.4  100 
Leather products  0.3  5.2  0.0  35.1  12.6  52.2  100 
Footwear  0.1  0.1  1.9  46.0  40.3  11.8  100 
Wood  0.7  1.8  1.9  38.4  29.7  30.0  100 
Paper  0.3  1.1  8.3  34.6  19.1  37.9  100 
Press  0.5  0.3  17.2  35.6  9.6  37.6  100 
Oil refinery  1.0  6.4  7.1  10.1  1.6  81.2  100 
Plaguicides  0.1  0.3  10.1  19.8  9.9  60.2  100 
Laboratories  0.4  1.3  27.6  34.3  6.2  31.9  100 
Basic Chemicals  0.6  2.8  10.0  25.0  9.1  55.9  100 
Rubber and plastic  0.6  3.0  6.8  39.6  11.6  42.0  100 
Mineral products  0.5  0.5  8.8  29.6  28.2  33.4  100 
Metal products and machinery  1.8  2.8  6.1  35.3  12.9  45.7  100 
Vehicles  0.3  1.6  17.0  29.4  16.5  37.1  100 
Other manufactures  0.5  1.0  5.0  51.3  28.7  15.0  100 
Services 
Electricity, gas and water  3.3  0.3  5.4  9.9  5.1  79.6  100 
Construction  6.3  0.0  5.5  26.4  34.8  33.3  100 
Commerce  13.7  0.0  7.4  44.1  18.4  30.0  100 
Hotels and restaurants  2.7  0.1  5.1  43.7  23.9  27.3  100 
Other transport  3.2  1.1  2.3  45.1  25.7  27.0  100 
Passenger transport/cargo shipping  2.6  9.8  6.2  30.7  6.5  56.6  100 
Communications  3.5  0.0  9.5  19.2  4.3  67.0  100 
Financial services  5.7  4.8  16.7  27.8  1.8  53.8  100 
Real estate  12.1  0.1  0.4  2.5  0.2  96.9  100 
Services to enterprises  4.0  2.4  52.2  30.3  6.1  11.4  100 
Public services  4.6  0.1  27.5  48.8  22.5  1.2  100 
Education  3.3  0.0  51.1  35.7  5.7  7.4  100 
Health  4.8  0.0  48.3  30.3  7.0  14.4  100 
Other services  3.1  0.0  12.0  35.7  14.0  38.2  100 
Services to Households  1.4  0.0  0.6  37.8  61.4  0.2  100 
   Total  100.0  100.0  12.3  27.1  14.9  45.7  100 
Source: SAM   33 
 
Table A.2. Production results. Variations with respect to base scenario, by simulation (%, real)  
   Crisis Scenarios  Crisis + Policy Scenarios 
   PRICE DEM TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
Rice  -5,5  0,0  -5,5  0,2  -5,3  -5,6  -5,3  -5,2  -5,5 
Other cereals  -5,8  0,0  -5,8 -0,3  -6,1  -6,9  -6,2  -6,3  -7,0 
Vegetables  10,7  -0,2  10,2 -1,1  9,3  12,1  8,8  8,6  11,4 
Fruit  4,4  0,0  4,4 -0,2  4,2  4,5  4,2  4,1  4,4 
Milk  -19,3  0,0  -19,3  0,0  -19,4  -19,2  -19,5  -19,5  -19,3 
Livestock  0,0  0,0  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,0  0,1  0,1  0,1 
Poultry  1,2  0,0  1,1 -0,1  1,1  1,7  1,0  1,0  1,7 
Forestry  2,2  0,0  2,2  0,0  2,2  2,3  2,2  2,2  2,2 
Fishing  1,3  0,0  1,4  0,3  1,6  1,2  1,7  1,8  1,4 
Mining  -7,5  0,0  -7,5  0,0  -7,4  -7,8  -7,4  -7,4  -7,8 
Meat processing  1,7  0,0  1,8  0,1  1,8  1,8  1,9  1,9  1,9 
Fish products  -0,7  0,1  -0,6  0,3  -0,3  -0,8  -0,2  -0,2  -0,6 
Other food industry  0,8  0,0  0,7  0,0  0,7  1,0  0,7  0,7  0,9 
Vegetable oils  2,5  0,0  2,4 -0,1  2,3  3,1  2,3  2,2  3,0 
Dairy products  -22,7  0,0  -22,8  0,1  -22,8  -22,6  -22,8  -22,8  -22,7 
Rice processing  -7,8  0,0  -7,7  0,2  -7,5  -7,9  -7,4  -7,4  -7,8 
Mills  0,6  -0,1  0,5 -0,2  0,4  1,7  0,2  0,2  1,6 
Animal food  -1,9  0,0  -1,9  0,0  -1,9  -1,1  -2,0  -2,0  -1,1 
Bread and pasta  0,6  -0,1  0,5 -0,3  0,3  1,2  0,1  0,1  1,0 
Sugar  -1,2  0,0  -1,1  0,1  -1,1  -1,2  -1,0  -1,0  -1,2 
Wine  1,6  -0,1  1,5 -0,3  1,3  2,1  1,1  1,1  1,9 
Beverages from barley  2,0  0,1  2,1  0,3  2,4  2,1  2,5  2,6  2,3 
Other beverages  -0,2  -0,1  -0,4 -0,2  -0,6  -0,2  -0,7  -0,7  -0,4 
Tobacco  1,2  0,0  1,2  0,0  1,2  1,3  1,2  1,2  1,2 
Basic Textiles  -20,0  0,0  -19,9  0,2  -19,8  -20,2  -19,7  -19,7  -20,1 
Other textiles  2,4  0,0  2,3  0,0  2,3  1,7  2,3  2,3  1,6 
Clothing  0,0  0,0  -0,1 -0,1  -0,2  0,2  -0,2  -0,2  0,1 
Leather products  -15,4  0,1  -15,2  0,6  -14,8  -15,7  -14,6  -14,5  -15,4 
Footwear  -3,7  -0,3  -4,3 -1,4  -5,5  -1,8  -6,1  -6,2  -2,6 
Wood  2,2  0,0  2,2 -0,1  2,1  0,7  2,1  2,1  0,6 
Paper  3,0  0,0  3,1  0,2  3,3  3,1  3,3  3,4  3,2 
Press  -0,9  0,0  -1,0 -0,1  -1,1  -0,8  -1,2  -1,2  -0,9 
Oil refinery  6,4  -0,1  6,3 -0,3  6,0  5,9  5,9  5,9  5,7 
Plaguicides  -3,1  -0,1  -3,2 -0,3  -3,5  -3,4  -3,6  -3,7  -3,6 
Laboratories  1,6  0,0  1,7  0,2  2,0  1,5  2,0  2,1  1,7 
Basic Chemicals  3,5  -0,4  2,8 -0,6  2,6  1,4  1,8  1,5  0,4 
Rubber and plastic  1,6  -0,3  0,8 -0,7  0,5  -0,7  -0,2  -0,5  -1,7 
Mineral products  11,5  -0,1  11,3 -1,1  10,2  6,4  10,0  9,8  6,0 
Metal products   0,3  -0,3  -0,3 -0,9  -1,0  -3,1  -1,5  -1,8  -3,9 
Vehicles  1,1  0,0  1,1  0,0  1,1  -0,4  1,1  1,1  -0,4 
Other manufactures  0,3  -0,1  0,2 -0,4  -0,2  -0,8  -0,3  -0,4  -1,0 
Electricity, gas and water  0,5  0,0  0,4 -0,1  0,3  0,6  0,2  0,2  0,6 
Construction  0,1  -0,1  -0,1 -1,2  -1,4  -5,6  -1,7  -1,9  -6,1 
Commerce  -5,1  0,0  -5,1 -0,1  -5,3  -6,4  -5,3  -5,3  -6,4 
Hotels and restaurants  -0,4  -0,1  -0,6 -0,3  -0,8  -0,3  -1,0  -1,0  -0,5 
Other transport  5,3  0,0  5,1 -0,2  4,9  5,1  4,8  4,8  5,0 
Passenger transport cargo shipping  2,8  -0,3  2,3 -0,3  2,2  1,0  1,7  1,4  0,2 
Comunications  -0,5  0,0  -0,5 -0,1  -0,7  -0,7  -0,7  -0,8  -0,7 
Financial services  -0,2  0,0  -0,2  0,0  -0,2  -0,4  -0,2  -0,2  -0,4 
Real estate  -0,1  0,0  -0,1  0,0  -0,1  -0,1  -0,1  -0,1  -0,1 
Services to enterprices  -0,2  0,0  -0,2 -0,3  -0,5  -2,3  -0,6  -0,6  -2,4 
Public services  -0,3  0,0  -0,3 -0,1  -0,4  7,7  -0,4  -0,4  7,7 
Education  -0,1  0,0  -0,1 -0,1  -0,2  6,5  -0,2  -0,2  6,5 
Health  -0,3  0,0  -0,3 -0,1  -0,5  2,9  -0,5  -0,5  2,9 
Other services  -0,6  0,0  -0,7 -0,2  -0,9  -0,4  -1,0  -1,0  -0,5 
Services to households  -1,2  -0,1  -1,4 -0,4  -1,8  -0,8  -2,0  -2,0  -1,1   34 
Table A.3. Exports results. Variations with respect to base scenario, by simulation (%, real)  
 
   Crisis Scenarios  Crisis + Policy Scenarios 
   PRICE DEM TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
Rice  6,0  0,0  6,1  0,1  6,2  6,0  6,3  6,3  6,1 
Other cereals  -14,5  0,0  -14,5  0,0  -14,5  -15,0  -14,5  -14,5  -15,0 
Vegetables  10,6  -0,1  10,3 -0,5  9,9  11,4  9,7  9,6  11,1 
Fruit  4,9  0,0  4,9  0,1  5,0  4,9  5,1  5,1  5,0 
Livestock  3,0  0,0  3,0  0,1  3,2  3,0  3,2  3,2  3,1 
Poultry  3,1  0,0  3,1  0,1  3,3  3,4  3,3  3,3  3,5 
Forestry  3,6  0,0  3,7  0,2  3,9  3,6  3,9  4,0  3,7 
Fishing  6,2  0,1  6,3  0,4  6,7  6,0  6,9  7,0  6,2 
Mining  8,2  0,0  8,4  0,3  8,6  8,2  8,7  8,8  8,3 
Meat processing  2,0  0,0  2,1  0,2  2,3  2,0  2,4  2,4  2,1 
Fish products  -1,0  0,1  -0,8  0,4  -0,5  -1,1  -0,4  -0,3  -0,9 
Other food industry  2,0  0,0  2,1  0,3  2,4  2,0  2,5  2,5  2,1 
Vegetable oils  3,3  0,0  3,3  0,2  3,5  3,6  3,6  3,6  3,6 
Dairy products  -36,9  0,0  -36,9  0,3  -36,8  -37,0  -36,7  -36,7  -36,9 
Rice processing  -8,7  0,0  -8,6  0,3  -8,3  -8,9  -8,2  -8,2  -8,7 
Mills  2,5  0,0  2,5  0,2  2,7  3,5  2,7  2,7  3,6 
Animal food  0,9  0,0  1,0  0,3  1,2  1,5  1,3  1,3  1,6 
Bread and pasta  2,3  0,0  2,3  0,1  2,5  2,6  2,5  2,5  2,6 
Sugar  -1,8  0,0  -1,7  0,2  -1,6  -1,9  -1,5  -1,5  -1,8 
Wine  3,2  0,0  3,2  0,2  3,4  3,4  3,4  3,4  3,5 
Beverages from barley  2,6  0,1  2,7  0,4  3,1  2,7  3,3  3,4  2,9 
Other beverages  1,6  0,0  1,6  0,2  1,8  1,3  1,8  1,9  1,4 
Tobacco  2,2  0,0  2,3  0,3  2,5  2,1  2,6  2,7  2,2 
Basic Textiles  -25,3  0,1  -25,2  0,3  -25,0  -25,6  -24,9  -24,9  -25,5 
Other textiles  2,9  0,0  3,0  0,2  3,1  2,3  3,2  3,2  2,4 
Clothing  1,1  0,0  1,2  0,2  1,4  1,0  1,5  1,5  1,2 
Leather products  -15,7  0,1  -15,5  0,6  -15,0  -16,0  -14,8  -14,8  -15,7 
Footwear  -1,6  -0,2  -2,0 -0,7  -2,5  -0,4  -2,9  -3,0  -0,7 
Wood  3,0  0,1  3,1  0,3  3,3  2,1  3,4  3,4  2,2 
Paper  4,1  0,1  4,3  0,4  4,6  4,0  4,8  4,8  4,2 
Press  1,0  0,0  1,1  0,2  1,3  0,7  1,3  1,4  0,8 
Oil refinery  -10,9  0,0  -10,8  0,0  -10,8  -11,2  -10,7  -10,7  -11,2 
Plaguicides  -0,8  0,0  -0,9  0,0  -0,9  -1,2  -0,9  -1,0  -1,3 
Laboratories  2,5  0,1  2,7  0,4  3,1  1,9  3,3  3,3  2,2 
Basic Chemicals  4,0  -0,5  3,0 -0,7  2,8  1,2  1,8  1,3  -0,2 
Rubber and plastic  2,2  -0,5  1,3 -0,8  1,0  -0,5  0,0  -0,5  -2,0 
Mineral products  16,0  0,0  16,0 -0,4  15,6  12,7  15,6  15,5  12,5 
Metal products and machinery  1,5  -0,4  0,7 -0,9  0,2  -1,6  -0,6  -1,0  -2,8 
Vehicles  2,0  0,0  2,1  0,3  2,3  0,9  2,4  2,5  1,0 
Other manufactures  1,6  0,0  1,6  0,0  1,6  0,8  1,6  1,6  0,8 
Electricity, gas and water  3,7  0,1  3,9  0,4  4,2  3,2  4,4  4,5  3,4 
Commerce  0,5  0,0  0,5  0,2  0,7  -0,2  0,7  0,8  -0,1 
Hotels and restaurants  1,4  0,0  1,4  0,1  1,5  1,3  1,5  1,6  1,4 
Other transport  6,9  0,0  6,9  0,1  7,0  6,7  7,1  7,1  6,8 
Passenger transport and cargo shipping  4,2  -0,4  3,4 -0,5  3,3  1,8  2,5  2,1  0,6 
Comunications  1,5  0,1  1,6  0,4  1,9  0,9  2,1  2,1  1,1 
Financial services  1,5  0,1  1,6  0,4  2,0  0,6  2,1  2,2  0,8 
Real estate  2,2  0,1  2,5  0,6  3,0  2,2  3,3  3,4  2,5 
Services to enterprises  1,9  0,1  2,0  0,3  2,3  -0,6  2,4  2,5  -0,4 
Public services  1,7  0,1  1,8  0,3  2,1  6,6  2,3  2,3  6,8 
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Table A.4. Imports results. Variations with respect to base scenario, by simulation (%, real)  
 
   Crisis Scenarios  Crisis + Policy Scenarios 
   PRICE DEM TRADE FIN CRISIS PUBCON PUBINV UNBEN PUBTOT 
Rice  -18,6  0,0  -18,6  0,2  -18,5  -18,7  -18,4  -18,4  -18,7 
Other cereals  -4,3  -0,1  -4,6 -0,9  -5,4  -6,5  -5,7  -5,8  -6,9 
Vegetables  -3,5  -0,1  -3,7 -0,6  -4,2  -3,3  -4,5  -4,5  -3,6 
Fruit  -2,9  -0,1  -3,2 -0,8  -4,0  -3,6  -4,3  -4,4  -4,0 
Raw milk  -25,0  0,0  -25,1 -0,2  -25,3  -24,9  -25,4  -25,5  -25,0 
Livestock  -4,2  0,0  -4,2 -0,1  -4,3  -4,2  -4,3  -4,3  -4,2 
Poultry  -2,7  -0,1  -2,9 -0,4  -3,2  -2,4  -3,4  -3,4  -2,6 
Forestry  -2,8  -0,1  -3,0 -0,6  -3,6  -3,2  -3,8  -3,9  -3,6 
Fishing  -7,0  0,0  -7,0 -0,1  -7,1  -6,9  -7,2  -7,2  -6,9 
Mining  9,3  -0,1  9,1 -0,4  8,7  8,1  8,6  8,5  7,9 
Meat processing  -4,6  -0,1  -4,8 -0,6  -5,3  -4,4  -5,5  -5,6  -4,7 
Fish products  -3,0  -0,1  -3,2 -0,5  -3,6  -2,8  -3,8  -3,9  -3,1 
Other food industry  -2,5  -0,1  -2,8 -0,6  -3,3  -2,2  -3,5  -3,6  -2,6 
Vegetable oils  -1,5  -0,1  -1,8 -0,5  -2,2  -1,4  -2,4  -2,5  -1,7 
Dairy products  -0,6  -0,1  -0,9 -0,7  -1,4  -0,3  -1,7  -1,8  -0,7 
Rice processing  -5,3  -0,1  -5,5 -0,6  -6,0  -4,7  -6,3  -6,4  -5,0 
Mills  -3,1  -0,1  -3,4 -0,6  -3,9  -3,1  -4,2  -4,3  -3,4 
Animal food  -5,5  -0,1  -5,7 -0,4  -6,1  -5,2  -6,2  -6,3  -5,5 
Bread and pasta  -2,8  -0,1  -3,1 -0,6  -3,6  -2,5  -3,9  -4,0  -2,8 
Sugar  -2,8  -0,1  -3,0 -0,5  -3,4  -2,6  -3,7  -3,7  -2,9 
Wine  -2,9  -0,2  -3,3 -0,8  -4,0  -2,7  -4,3  -4,4  -3,2 
Beverages from barley  -3,2  -0,1  -3,5 -0,7  -4,1  -2,9  -4,4  -4,5  -3,3 
Other beverages  -2,7  -0,1  -3,0 -0,8  -3,7  -2,4  -4,0  -4,1  -2,8 
Tobacco  -2,7  -0,2  -3,0 -0,8  -3,7  -2,5  -4,0  -4,1  -2,9 
Basic Textiles  -4,6  -0,1  -4,8 -0,4  -5,2  -4,4  -5,3  -5,4  -4,7 
Other textiles  -2,5  -0,1  -2,8 -0,8  -3,5  -3,4  -3,8  -4,0  -3,8 
Clothing  -2,6  -0,1  -2,9 -0,8  -3,6  -2,4  -3,9  -4,0  -2,8 
Leather products  -9,8  -0,1  -9,9 -0,4  -10,3  -10,1  -10,5  -10,5  -10,3 
Footwear  -2,7  -0,1  -3,0 -0,8  -3,6  -2,6  -3,9  -4,0  -3,0 
Wood  -1,8  -0,2  -2,2 -1,3  -3,3  -5,2  -3,7  -3,9  -5,8 
Paper  -3,4  -0,1  -3,6 -0,4  -4,0  -3,1  -4,1  -4,2  -3,3 
Press  -3,2  -0,1  -3,5 -0,7  -4,1  -2,4  -4,4  -4,5  -2,8 
Oil refinery  35,2  -0,1  34,7 -0,7  33,8  34,5  33,4  33,2  33,9 
Plaguicides  -4,7  -0,1  -4,8 -0,4  -5,2  -5,1  -5,3  -5,4  -5,4 
Laboratories  -2,1  -0,1  -2,3 -0,6  -2,8  -0,4  -3,0  -3,1  -0,7 
Basic Chemicals  -1,5  -0,2  -1,8 -0,6  -2,3  -2,2  -2,6  -2,8  -2,7 
Rubber and plastic  -1,9  -0,1  -2,1 -0,6  -2,6  -2,9  -2,8  -2,9  -3,1 
Mineral products  -7,6  -0,2  -8,0 -1,5  -9,4  -12,5  -9,8  -10,0  -13,1 
Metal products and machinery  -3,0  -0,2  -3,4 -1,4  -4,7  -7,2  -5,1  -5,4  -7,9 
Vehicles  -2,7  -0,2  -3,1 -1,0  -4,0  -5,3  -4,3  -4,5  -5,8 
Other manufactures  -3,0  -0,2  -3,4 -1,1  -4,3  -4,7  -4,7  -4,8  -5,2 
Electricity, gas and water  -4,4  -0,2  -4,7 -0,8  -5,4  -3,3  -5,8  -5,9  -3,7 
Commerce  -3,0  -0,1  -3,3 -0,8  -4,0  -3,2  -4,3  -4,4  -3,6 
Hotels and restaurants  -2,8  -0,2  -3,2 -0,8  -3,8  -2,4  -4,1  -4,3  -2,9 
Other transport  -5,4  -0,1  -5,7 -0,7  -6,3  -5,4  -6,6  -6,7  -5,8 
Passenger transport and cargo shipping  -3,3  -0,1  -3,6 -0,5  -4,1  -4,0  -4,3  -4,5  -4,4 
Comunications  -3,2  -0,2  -3,5 -0,8  -4,2  -2,6  -4,6  -4,7  -3,1 
Financial services  -3,1  -0,2  -3,4 -0,9  -4,2  -1,9  -4,5  -4,7  -2,4 
Real estate  -3,3  -0,2  -3,6 -0,9  -4,5  -3,3  -4,8  -5,0  -3,8 
Services to enterprises  -3,6  -0,2  -4,0 -1,1  -4,9  -4,2  -5,3  -5,5  -4,8 
Other services  -3,1  -0,1  -3,4 -0,8  -4,1  -2,3  -4,4  -4,5  -2,7 
 